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Purpose- In this paper, we have evaluated the relationship of 
corporate governance with companies’ financial returns using 
return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed (ROCE) as 
proxies. For this purpose, companies listed in Nifty-50 are 
considered as a sample. 
Design/Methodology- The present study is conducted on the 
NIFTY-50 Index with a final sample of 35 companies after 
excluding banking companies, financial services companies, and 
companies that did not have the required data in the sample period.  
Data has been collected for ten years from 2009-10 to 2018-19, and 
they are analyzed with the help of software packages such as SPSS 
and Stata. 
Findings- The results showed that firms’ financial return measures 
(ROA and ROCE) were significantly affected by governance 
measures, board committees, and CEO duality. Board size, board 
meetings, and board independence did show positive relation, but 
it was not significant. Our analysis observed that corporate 
governance significantly affected the financial return of Indian 
listed companies. 
Practical Implications- Our research work indicated the importance 
of corporate governance in generating financial returns for Indian 
listed companies.  CEO duality is found to be increasing the ROCE 
of listed companies in India, and therefore investors should choose 
such companies where the CEO plays a dual role in the board. 
Also, policymakers should take into consideration the dual role of 
CEOs while making changes in company regulations.   
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The focus has been shifted from management to corporate governance (CG) during the last century. 
Organizations are giving more attention to their governance aspect as they are witnessing its dual role.  A 
positive impact happens when the governance system is well structured and has a negative effect in case of its 
failure. The word governance is ancient, but the phrase corporate governance is young. After the 1991 economic 
reforms, the significance of corporate governance has increased mainly because of the entry of private 
companies. Globalization, access to global markets, and being listed on overseas exchanges have made the 
Indian corporates keen-eyed towards safeguarding investors’ interests and promoting transparency. Recession 
and corporate governance reforms have a cyclical relationship. After a governance failure, economies try to 
make reforms, but governance still fails, and the cycle continues, and it continues till now.  
Corporates and their shareholders forget to ensure good governance practices and focus on increasing their 
wealth during long periods of expansion. This diminishes their active interest in corporate governance. 
Corporate governance reforms face various significant challenges, and one of those is that it depends mainly 
on the economic, legal, and political environment, which are different in different countries. Due to this reason, 
there is not a single set of governance practices that can be applied globally to every organization. Among the 
numerous corporate governance aspects, the most important one is the board of directors, as the board can 
significantly improve the financial returns of any organization.  
The traditional aim of corporate boards was to ensure profit to its shareholders, but there has been a shift in 
that approach. In recent times, the board needs to focus on creating and maximizing stakeholders' wealth, which 
is the primary focus of corporate governance. The board of directors bridges the distance between shareholders 
and managers. The existing Indian literature on corporate governance has witnessed a rise in measuring the 
effect of board characteristics on corporate performance. However, most of the studies are either based on a 
stock market index or manufacturing industries. There are very few research endeavors concerning the service 
industry, particularly the banking sector. 
The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) took the initiative to develop corporate governance practices in 
1998. This marked the beginning of governance reforms in India, which is still in the transition phase. The 
Indian economy is a diverse and dynamic combination of small, medium, and large companies. The Indian 
corporate sector has a pivotal role in nation-building, and efficient corporate governance practices are vital for 
strengthening economic growth. Corporate governance is the relationship between all the prominent 
stakeholders, including “shareholders,” “top management,” “board of directors,” “employees,” “regulators,” 
and the “community.” They all play a significant role in determining the conduct and performance of a 
corporation. Segregation of ownership from management is the main reason corporate governance came as a 
legal norm and will always be there.  
The CEO and the board of directors are crucial as most of the governance failures are related to these two 
aspects of a company. The board links the capital contributors to users of the capital, and it is the board that 
the shareholders and investors will hold accountable for their contributions to the organization. Although 
studies on corporate governance are rising in the Indian scenario, the role of CEOs is yet to get a prominent 
position in the Indian corporate governance literature. 
The success of an organization belonging to any industry depends primarily on corporate governance. It focuses 
on the internal structure of an organization. It provides various guidelines about management control, board 
of directors, formation of the independent audit committee, formation of other important committees, and 
disclosure of information to shareholders and creditors. So, corporate governance can be defined as “a system 
consisting of some persons, committees, laws, and rules that ensure that suppliers of capital get a fair return on 
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their investment. And an assurance that their investments are being safeguarded and a promise that the business 
is managed according to their interests”. This makes corporate governance crucial for any sector. Corporate 
governance starts from the system and ends with honesty. It does not have a single standard, and its best 
practices differ from country to country. The constituents of a good governance practice are still in the process 
of development. Good corporate governance always shares some common elements: accountability, fairness, 
openness, and transparency. Over the years, it has been assumed and seen that corporate governance is playing 
a pioneering role in companies' performance and overall growth.  
Researchers are continuously trying to document the connection between corporate governance and various 
aspects of an organization, particularly its financial performance. Stakeholders are also becoming increasingly 
interested in the governance practices of their company due to its ability to influence a company’s overall 
performance. However, in recent times, both the Indian and global economies have witnessed performance 
irregularities, faulty accounting practices, and rising scandals in the corporate sector. This is because of a lack 
of monitoring of the governance practices of the companies. Therefore, governments and regulatory authorities 
must have a continuous watch over the changes in the governance structure of the companies. The research on 
the relationship between corporate governance and the Indian banking sector is under-explored (Abdul Gafoor 
et al., 2018). Therefore, there is a growing need to explore the relationship between these two. Also, there is a 
deficiency of literature supporting the notion that good governance affects corporate reputation in the Indian 
context (Kaur & Singh, 2018).                     
Literature Review 
Safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders is the primary duty of the board of directors. The board should 
motivate and inspire the managers to pursue the interests of the stakeholders. The board also links an 
organization with its external environment. In this research work, we are trying to ascertain the effect of 
corporate governance on financial performance, regarding which previous literature has reported both positive 
and negative results. According to Guest (2009), the board of directors functions as a nexus between suppliers 
of finance (shareholders and investors) and users (managers) of finance. He analyzed the association between 
board size and financial performance of UK firms. He observed that UK firms’ Tobin’s Q, profitability, and 
share return were strongly and negatively affected by board size.  
Managers try to create long-term value by utilizing the finance obtained from shareholders and investors. The 
actions or conduct of a board is one of the major driving forces for better economic performance. Merendino 
and Melville (2019) observed a positive effect of a smaller board on firm performance and vice-versa. Some 
authors have also found that board characteristics and firm performance were not statistically associated (Borlea 
et al., 2017). While numerous other works have reported a positive effect of size of the corporate board on 
financial performance (Kathuria & Dash, 1999; Dwivedi & Jain, 2005), some authors have also reported 
contradictory results (Ghosh, 2006; Kota & Tomar, 2010; Kumar & Singh, 2013).  
In another study, the authors reported a significant effect of board size and board independence on banks’ 
financial results (Abdul Gafoor et al., 2018). In the case of Greece, firms performed better with a larger board, 
but their financial performance was reduced due to an increase in board independence (Zhou et al., 2018). The 
number of directors on the board (board size) is one of the most important aspects of corporate governance, 
and it has a significant influence on corporate financial performance. Board size is a significant driver of 
corporate reputation (Kaur & Singh, 2018). In the case of Pakistani firms, board size significantly and positively 
contributes towards Tobin’s Q and ROE, but independent directors negatively affect financial performance 
(Waheed & Malik, 2019). Board size positively correlates with UK banks’ efficiency measures; however, the 
association is not robust (Tanna et al., 2011). While Belkhir (2009) reports that an increase in the board size 
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increases the ROA of companies, Palaniappan (2017) reported a negative interrelation between board size and 
financial performance. 
Corporate boards are the very reason for which focus has been given to the governance structure of companies. 
The structure of the governing body has been able to capture the interest of both academicians and researchers. 
The corporate board is usually a coalition of both executive and non-executive directors. However, the rules 
relating to its ratio and independence are different in different parts of the globe. Independent directors are the 
backbone of the Indian corporate governance framework as they improve the board’s effectiveness and 
safeguard all stakeholders' interests.  
Organizations at present need separate boards, which can also be evidenced by the mandatory rules and 
regulations formed by the government and various regulatory bodies. In this regard, studies have reported that 
a lower board independence positively affected firm performance and vice-versa (Merendino & Melville, 2019). 
It has also been found that financial return (ROA) is significantly and positively affected by board independence 
(Dey & Chauhan, 2009; Kumar & Singh, 2012; Mishra & Kapil, 2018). After analyzing the connection between 
the financial performance of agriculture companies with the prevailing governance structure in New Zealand, 
Roudaki (2018) reported no association between board independence and companies’ performance.  
A corporate board monitors and provides linkage to external resources by way of participating in the board 
meetings. Board meetings are one of the ways for every member to interact with each other. Board meetings 
are beneficial to make decisions about the future of the organization. It is also mandated by the law that boards 
of the companies have to meet a certain number of times in a particular financial year. The enthusiastic 
involvement of board members in the board meetings greatly reflects their commitment level. The seamless 
effort during the board meetings and the subsequent follow-up of decisions taken show the level of 
commitment of the directors. In this context, Mishra and Kapil (2018) reported that the number of board 
meetings conducted by an organization has no impact on ROA, which is also supported by the findings of 
Kiranmai and Mishra (2019). The board of directors forms different types of board-level committees to address 
various issues more effectively. Since the institutionalization of corporate governance as a board room concept, 
the number of board committees formed by the corporations has been an integral part of the governance 
literature. The board of directors is often weighed down with many responsibilities. Therefore, they form 
various committees to ensure effective governance, deal with business problems more diligently, and maintain 
the smooth flow of business operations. Regarding the relationship of Tobin’s Q with financial performance, 
Singh et al. (2018) found it significant and positive. 
On the other hand, Kiranmai and Mishra (2019) reported that board committees positively affected firms’ net 
profit. The impact of CEO duality on corporate financial results has been a topic of debate for quite a while 
now. CEO duality (both Chairman and CEO being the same person) may help form an integrated command 
and control system in corporations. As per the agency theory, the dual role of CEOs increases their influence 
in the organization, creating agency conflicts and a decrease in firm performance. To make the board more 
effective, organizations can separate the position of the CEO. However, prior studies have shown mixed 
outcomes concerning how CEO duality is affecting organization performance. The importance of CEO duality 
is increasing in companies. Yang & Zhao (2014) reported that companies with CEO duality perform 3-4% 
better than non-duality companies. Corporate governance attracts investment opportunities for companies 
which are particularly important in the case of listed companies. In this regard, we aim at studying the association 
of CG with the financial returns of listed companies and also to gauge the impact of CG facets on the financial 
return of companies listed in Nifty 50. Most of the prior studies are focused on a particular sector or based on 
a large sample. Still, this study intends to portray a microscopic view of corporate governance's effect on 
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financial results. Based on the literature reviewed, we proposed the relevant hypotheses regarding all the CG 
variables depicted in the following figure.  
 
Methodology 
The sample for the study consists of 35 companies from the NIFTY-50 Index after excluding banking 
companies, financial services companies, and companies that did not have the required data for the sample 
period.  Data has been collected for ten years from 2009-10 to 2018-19. The sample companies' annual financial 
reports of sample companies were collected from their official websites, and corporate governance data were 
screened out from them. Further, the CMIE Prowess database is used for various financial performance 
indicators of sample companies. We use various statistical techniques such as average, standard deviation from 
mean, correlation, and regression. The data have been analyzed with the help of software packages such as 
SPSS25 and Stata15.    
Variables  
Past literature shows that financial performance has been measured with the help of several parameters. In this 
study, we have also used several variables based on prior literature. A detailed explanation of the variables used 
in the study and their measurement has been given in Table 1. In the present study, ROA (Merendino & 
Melville, 2019; Waheed & Malik, 2019) and ROCE (Dey & Chauhan, 2009) are considered indicators of firms’ 
financial return used as the dependent variables in the analysis. Both ROA and ROCE are accounting-based 
measures used in numerous corporate governance studies. While ROA depicts the company's efficiency in using 
its assets to generate earnings, ROCE indicates an organization's capability to generate profits from its capital 
investment and is a renowned indicator of fund utilization. The CG variables used in the present research are 
“board size,” “board meetings,” “board committees,” “board independence,” and “CEO duality.” Also, to 
control the age and size effect on the governance-performance relationship, we used “firm age” and “firm size” 
as control variables.  
Table 1. Variables Used 
Variable Name  Measurement Description   
ROA Percentage  Net profit/total assets. 
ROCE Percentage  EBIT/capital employed.  
BS Number  Aggregate number of directors on the corporate board.  
BM Number  No. board meetings conducted.  
BC Number  No. of board level committees.  
BIND Ratio  Independent directors/total directors.  
CEOD Binary (Yes/No) 1 if Chairman is also the CEO or 0 otherwise 
Age Number  Natural logarithm of age of the company.  




Board Committees  
Board Independence 
CEO Duality 




Figure 1 - Framework of the study 
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To assess the effect of CG on corporate financial return, we propose the following regression models: 
ROA = β0 + β1BS + β2BM + β3BC + β4BIND + β5CEOD + β6Age + β7Size + ε 
ROCE = β0 + β1BS + β2BM + β3BC + β4BIND + β5CEOD + β6Age + β7Size + ε 
Operational Research Design 
In the present study, we are dealing with panel data, and multiple regression techniques will be used to study 
the impact. But before applying any regression estimators, the data should be checked for multicollinearity. 
Usually, OLS estimators should be applied while measuring the impact of independent variables on dependent 
variables. But, OLS estimators can only be applied if two assumptions are satisfied: serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. Otherwise, we will have to go for GLS (FE/RE) estimators. For this purpose, we conducted 
diagnostic tests and model specification tests. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
We start our analysis by calculating descriptive statistics, and the results are presented in Table 2. The minimum 
board size was four during the sample period, while the maximum was 22, with a mean of 11.78 and SD 2.810. 
This implies that there are companies that have a large board size. The minimum value of BM was three while 
the board met for a maximum number of 22 times in a year. BC stays between 2 and 17, with a mean of 6.65 
and SD of 3.009. The descriptive statistics showed that while few companies had no independent directors on 
their board, others had 83.3% board independence. ROA and ROCE have a mean of 12.426 and 20.707 with 
SD 10.635 and 20.265, respectively.   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis 
BS 350 4 22 11.78 12 2.810 0.365 0.758 
BM 350 3 22 7.40 6 3.280 1.622 2.788 
BC 350 2 17 6.65 6 3.009 0.994 1.162 
BIND 350 0.000 0.833 0.529 0.5 0.127 -0.624 2.851 
CEOD 350 0 1 0.52 1 0.500 -0.069 -2.007 
ROA 350 -8.780 73.790 12.426 9.720 10.635 1.933 6.657 
ROCE 350 -13.530 131.200 20.707 14.480 20.265 2.138 6.101 
Age 350 2.303 4.718 3.704 3.611 0.552 -0.036 -0.789 
Size 350 15.377 25.075 20.602 20.811 2.046 -0.167 -0.844 
Source: Authors. 
Correlation Analysis 
We have shown the results of Pearson correlation at 1% and 5% level of significance along with their respective 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
  BS BM BC BIND CEOD ROA ROCE Age Size 
BS 1                 
BM .226*** 1               
BC 0.093 .469*** 1             
BIND -0.083 -.378*** -.263*** 1           
CEOD .242*** .272*** .197*** -.175*** 1         
ROA -0.054 0.007 -0.016 0.104 -0.089 1       
ROCE -0.081 -0.041 0.014 0.075 -.157*** .864*** 1     
Age .149*** .125** -0.055 0.049 -.171*** .140*** .205*** 1   
Size .214*** .328*** .425*** -.106** .197*** -.282*** -.255*** 0.097 1 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**).  
Source: Authors 
The correlation results show that none of the explanatory variables have a coefficient more than 0.70, which 
eliminates the possibility of multicollinearity. None of the corporate governance variables have shown any 
significant association with the financial return measures except CEOD, which showed a significant negative 
association with ROCE at a 1% significance level. We find a significant correlation between firm age and firm 
size with ROA and ROCE at a 1% level.  
Collinearity Statistics 
In the case of a panel data structure, the first issue that needs to be addressed is multicollinearity among 
independent variables before applying the multiple regression. Multicollinearity is the high correlation among 
the independent variables, which can significantly affect the direction and impact of independent variables, and 
therefore it has to be addressed. We checked for multicollinearity with the help of correlation and variance 
inflation factors (VIF). Correlation analysis confirmed no collinearity, and it was also sustained by the VIF 
results reported in Table 4. It is clear from Table 4 that none of the corporate governance (independent) 
variables have a VIF of more than 10. The value of tolerance ranges between 0 to 1, and high tolerance refers 
to low multicollinearity. Since all the variables have a high tolerance value, we can safely say that there is no 
multicollinearity problem in the data. Also, the average VIF is 1.30, which confirms that there is no problem 
with multicollinearity.  
Table 4: Collinearity Statistics 
Variable VIF Tolerance (1/VIF) 
BS 1.15 0.871 
BM 1.57 0.635 
BC 1.49 0.671 
BIND 1.20 0.835 
CEOD 1.21 0.825 
Age 1.13 0.884 
Size 1.31 0.761 
Mean VIF 1.30  
Source: Authors. 
Diagnostic Tests and Results 
We applied OLS estimators to assess the effect of corporate governance on firms’ financial returns. But OLS 
provides appropriate results when its two basic assumptions are satisfied. There should be no 
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autocorrelation/serial correlation among data, and the data should be homoscedastic (no heteroskedasticity). 
To test for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, we have applied the Wooldridge test and Breusch-Pagan test, 
respectively, and Table 5 shows the results of these two diagnostic tests. 
Table 5: Diagnostic Tests and Model Specification Test 
 ROA ROCE 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation F-statistics 76.620 76.365 
Prob > F 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
H0: There is no autocorrelation  
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity Chi-square 31.17 79.16 
Prob > chi2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
H0: Constant variance 
Hausman Specification Test  Chi-square 15.34 22.93 
Prob > chi2 0.0318** 0.0018*** 
H0: RE is appropriate than FE.  
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**).  
Source: Authors. 
Table 6: Model Summary (GLS Fixed Effects Regression) 
Variables ROA ROCE 
 Coefficients  t-value Coefficients  t-value 
BS 0.035 0.18 0.127 0.38 
BM 0.179 1.03 0.185 0.61 
BC -0.465 -2.02** -0.664 -1.66* 
BIND 4.800 1.11 5.794 0.77 
CEOD 4.497 3.43*** 8.152 3.59*** 
Age -7.069 -1.55 -11.950 -1.52 
Size 1.394 2.05** 2.547 2.16** 
Constant -3.662 -0.36 -14.227 -0.81 
Observations 350 350 
F Statistics 29.95*** 37.91*** 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.7995 0.8346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7728 0.8126 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**).  
Source: Authors. 
As per the results depicted in Table 5, the null hypothesis is rejected as the diagnostic tests restrict the 
application of OLS estimators. Therefore, our study will use GLS regression estimators. Researchers dealing 
with panel data can use two types of GLS estimators: fixed effects estimator and random effects estimator. To 
select the appropriate estimator, we used the Hausman specification test, and its results are also shown in Table 
5. Based on the results of the Hausman test, we rejected the null hypothesis for both the models and resulted 
in favor of applying the fixed effects estimator. 
The outcomes of the fixed effect model are presented in Table 6 for both return measures. Based on the F-
statistics, we can deduce that the models are statistically significant in explaining the effect of CG on a 
company’s financial return. The R-squared value suggests that the corporate governance variables cause 79.95% 
variation in ROA and 83.46% variation in ROCE. We rejected the null hypothesis of BC and CEOD concerning 
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ROA. The fixed-effects model shows that the relationship between CEOD and ROA is significant and positive, 
whereas board committees have shown a significantly negative relationship with the same return measure. 
Board size, board meetings, and board independence have shown positive relations with ROA, but the results 
are not significant. Firm age has not shown any significant relation, while the firm size and ROA are found to 
be correlated, which is statically significant. With relation to ROCE, we find similar results as we rejected the 
null hypothesis for board committees and CEO duality. Both control variables showed results that are 
contradictory to each other. While the company's age did not show any significant impact on the financial return 
variables, size displayed a positive and significant effect on both return variables.    
Discussion 
In studying how the financial returns of Indian listed companies are affected by corporate governance, we used 
correlation and regression models to arrive at suitable conclusions. There is an insignificant negative relationship 
between performance variables and a firm’s board size, as shown in Table 6. ROA shows a positive relationship 
while ROCE shows a negative relationship with the number of the board meeting, which is statistically 
significant. On the contrary, board committees (BC) have shown a positive association with ROCE but a 
negative correlation with ROA, none of which is statistically significant. The composition of independent 
members in the board (BIND) reveals a statistically insignificant positive correlation with both the return 
variables. CEO duality seems to have a negative correlation with ROA, which is not statistically significant. 
However, its correlation with ROCE is negative and significant at 1%. Since we are dealing with panel data, 
multicollinearity has also been checked using VIF values that show no such problem. Based on the diagnostic 
tests, GLS fixed effects regression model is employed to evaluate the impact. 
H1 states that board size negatively affects firms’ financial returns. But our findings do not support the 
hypothesis as we found positive coefficients of board size relating to both financial return measures though it 
is not statistically significant. Therefore, we conclude that board size positively affects firm performance 
(Kiranmai & Mishra, 2019) though it is not statistically significant. H2 and H3 propose that board meetings and 
board committees positively affect the financial return of selected companies. We found supporting results 
relating to the null hypothesis for board meetings and reported a positive relation between board meetings and 
financial return though the relation is not statically significant. However, we could not support the null 
hypothesis of board committees as the results showed a statistically significant and negative coefficient. So, 
forming more board committees does not improve the financial return of selected companies. H4 is related to 
BIND, and the null hypothesis is that board independence positively affects firms’ financial returns (Merendino 
& Melville, 2019). Our results supported the hypothesis as we found positive coefficients for both measures of 
financial return ROA and ROCE. H5 states that CEOD (the role of Chairman and CEO vested in one person) 
has a negative impact on firms’ returns (Palaniappan, 2017). So far as the effect of dual of CEO on returns, we 
couldn’t agree with the null hypothesis of the existence of no significant impact. 
Conclusion 
The present study examined a hypothesized relationship between two important aspects of financial 
performance with selected corporate governance variables for the Indian companies listed in the Nifty-50 Index 
of the National Stock Exchange. The financial return was measured in terms of ROA and ROCE. The outcome 
of our analysis showed that firms’ financial returns are affected by their corporate governance practices. We 
observed significant results concerning board committees and CEO duality. Our results witnessed a positive 
relationship between board size, independence, and meetings and firms’ financial return. We observed that the 
board committee was negatively related to ROA & ROCE. Based on the findings, we can suggest that the board 
size of the companies listed under Nifty 50 should be rationalized, and it should have a ceiling. A high variation 
in the size of the board was observed during the period of study. Present work will enrich the existing literature 
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on corporate governance in general and specific governance components like CEO duality and board-related 
components. 
Practical Implications 
Corporate governance is a contemporary topic, and it requires continuous deliberations by various regulatory 
authorities. Listed companies play a prominent role in improving the state of the capital market and the nation's 
financial strength. Our study was conducted on companies coming under the Nifty 50 Index of the Indian stock 
market. This Index comprises some of the best-performing companies in India. So, a governance issue in these 
companies can cause turbulence in the entire stock market. The basic moto of this paper is to establish the 
relationship between various components of corporate governance mechanism on a firm’s financial health. 
Hence, policymakers should ensure that these facets of corporate governance are the focal point of every rule-
making process. Also, the number of board committees showed a negative effect on financial returns. This may 
be because there are very frequent meetings of the board in some of the years, which may mean that the board 
cannot reach a consensus about various issues, and it is affecting their financial returns. So, the policymakers 
should define the number of times the board should meet to take their business decisions. 
Limitations and Scope for Further Research  
The present study also suffers from certain limitations. We have used a small sample of 35 companies listed on 
the National Stock Exchange. Due to the lack of time, we couldn’t incorporate other essential aspects of 
corporate governance: ownership pattern, the busyness of directors, committees formed by the board, etc. The 
firm's financial results may vary significantly. Our work opens new doors for some future research aspects 
relating to corporate governance. Future researches can focus on ownership patterns, internal and external 
busyness of directors, other CEO characteristics, formation of different types of governance indexes, etc. 
Different performance measures can also be used, including ROA, Tobin’s Q, Net Profit, EPS, MBVR, etc. 
Future studies may also be conducted on specific sectors of India to determine the effect of corporate 
governance on various sectors. 
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